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HEALTH CARE FRAUD UNDER THE NEW




The investigation and prosecution of health care fraud over the last
several years has resulted in significant recoveries and settlements by the
government. The United States recovered approximately $1.5 billion in
fraud settlements and judgments for the fiscal year ending September 30,
2005, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") announced on November 7, 2005.
"As in the last several years, health care accounted for the lion's share of
fraud settlements and judgments," amounting to $1.1 billion, according to a
DOJ press release.' The DOJ stated that the Department of Health and
Human Services' ("HHS") biggest recoveries were largely attributable to
the Medicare and Medicaid programs.2 According to the Health Care Fraud
and Abuse Control ("HCFAC") program report released October 27, 2005
by the HHS Office of Inspector General ("OIG"), the federal government
won or negotiated $605 million in judgments and settlements in 2004
related to the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
3
. Mr. Rabecs is an attorney with the Washington, D.C. law firm of Hogan & Hartson
L.L.P. He is a member of the firm's Health Care Practice Group, and represents health
industry clients on a variety of regulatory and transactional matters. The views expressed in
this article do not necessarily represent the position of the author's firm nor the clients of the
firm, and should not be imputed to them. Mr. Rabecs also serves as an Adjunct Professor of
Law at The George Washington University Law School.
1 DOJ Cites $1.4 Billion in Fraud Recovery in FY 2005, Including Health Care Cases,
16 MEDICARE REP. (BNA) 1321 (2005).
2 id.
3 Report Says Anti-Fraud Efforts at HHS, DOJ Returned $1.5 Billion to Medicare
Program, 16 MEDICARE REP. (BNA) 1288 (2005). The HCFAC program was established by
Congress in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 to provide more
federal dollars to anti-fraud efforts by HHS and DOJ. The departments are required to
provide Congress an annual reporting on HCFAC program activities. Id.
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The level of investigation and enforcement activity involving health
care fraud is only likely to increase in the next several years as a result of
the new Medicare prescription drug program which went into effect on
January 1, 2006. The new program, known as Medicare Part D, was
created pursuant to the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and
Modernization Act of 2003 (the "MMA"). 5 Under the program, Medicare
beneficiaries will be able to obtain partial Medicare coverage and
reimbursement for their outpatient prescription drugs. Some studies have
estimated that the Part D program will cost an estimated $720 billion over
its first ten years.6 Lewis Morris, chief counsel to the HHS OIG, has said
that by far the largest enforcement challenge facing his office is the rollout
of the Part D program. "We expect the Part D program to be the focus of
bad actors because of its size alone," Morris said.7 Thus, because of the
increased money involved, the scrutiny into fraud and abuse may be much
more intense.
Implementation of Part D changes the enforcement landscape by
creating a new Medicare benefit to which the fraud and abuse authorities
will apply. Many Medicare beneficiaries will now have (or be eligible for)
Medicare coverage for prescription drugs who did not have coverage in the
past. The framework for fraud and abuse investigation and enforcement
will not necessarily change with Medicare Part D. Very little has changed
in terms of government enforcement weapons involving the Medicare Part
D program. The Federal Healthcare Programs' Anti-Kickback Statute 8 (the
"Anti-Kickback Statute"), the False Claims Act,9 and the civil money
penalties law' will likely continue to be the main enforcement tools. In
fact, Morris has said that, as the Part D program is implemented, the OIG
will continue to focus on practices it has targeted in the past, including
kickbacks.1
However, the application of the existing authorities will necessarily
have to focus on new abuses that may arise by virtue of the relationships
4 M. William Salganik, Medicare Drug Plan Starts Today, BuFF. NEWS, Jan. 1, 2006, at
Al.
5 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-73, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101-52 (2000 & Supp.
2005)).
6 Enforcement Officials Detail Weapons, Concerns Posed by Rx Benefit, 16 MEDICARE
REp. (BNA) 849 (2005).
7id.
8 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
9 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2000).
10 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a.
" Enforcement Officials Detail Weapons, Concerns Posed by Rx Benefit, supra note 6.
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and incentives unique to the Part D program. 12 In this regard, according to
James G. Sheehan, associate U.S. attorney in Philadelphia, "[t]he Medicare
Part D program involves specifically vulnerable beneficiaries, high-cost
populations, substantial control by providers, and creates a whole new
category of payments and financial relationships."' 13 Consequently, those
involved in the program will need to engage in very close scrutiny of their
operations and compliance obligations.
The types of fraud and abuse which may arise under the Part D
program are varied and may include: (1) pharmaceutical manufacturer
inducements paid to private insurance plans and pharmacy benefit managers
that will administer the Part D program in return for placement of the
manufacturer's drugs on plan formularies; (2) pharmaceutical
manufacturers and/or health plans paying subsidies to employers to keep
their Medicare-eligible employees/retirees on employer-sponsored
prescription drug plans; (3) health plan marketing of the Part D benefit to
Medicare beneficiaries (including cherry picking enrollees, shifting patients
between plans to generate commissions, and providing beneficiaries with
distorted information); and (4) health plan efforts to manipulate the period
during which Part D enrollees are responsible for paying 100% of their drug
costs. 14
This article will discuss two areas in which fraud and abuse may arise
under the new Part D program and which, therefore, could be subject to
government scrutiny and enforcement action. Both of these areas involve
the potential application of the Anti-Kickback Statute to cost-sharing
assistance provided to Part D enrollees by pharmacies and pharmaceutical
manufacturers which contract with Part D health plans.
II. MEDICARE PART D PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT
Medicare is a federally-funded insurance program that provides health
care coverage to most of America's senior citizens.' 5 To be eligible, an
individual must be a citizen or resident alien, 16 and at least sixty-five years
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.; HHS QIG to Expand Use of Administrative Sanctions for Receiving, Seeking
Kickbacks, 16 MEDICARE REP. (BNA) 688 (2005).
"S See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 1395hhh (2000); Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
Medicare Program - General Information, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareGenInfo/ (last
visited Jan. 29, 2006) (noting that Medicare provides coverage to those aged sixty-five and
older, individuals with certain disabilities, and individuals with end-stage renal disease).
16 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-2(a)(3).
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of age (or satisfy other qualifying conditions). 17 Prior to passage of the
MMA, the Medicare program consisted of Parts A, B and C. Part A
generally pays for inpatient care, such as hospitalizations. 8 Part B
generally covers outpatient care and physician services. 19 Historically,
Parts A and B have not provided Medicare coverage and reimbursement for
the entire range of available medical services, including outpatient
prescription drugs.
Policymakers have debated the need to add prescription drug coverage
to Medicare since the program's original enactment in the 1960s. However,
the costs associated with providing such coverage, as well as disagreement
over the role of the private sector in administering the coverage, proved to
be obstacles to extending Medicare program coverage and reimbursement
to outpatient prescription drugs.20  The 1967 amendments to the Social
Security Act called for the creation of a Task Force on Prescription Drugs
to study the possibility of adding a prescription drug benefit to Medicare.2 '
However, not until two decades later did Congress make the first of two
major attempts to pass legislation providing a prescription drug benefit
under Medicare.
In 1988, Congress passed the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act
("MCCA"), 22 which would have phased in "catastrophic" prescription drug
coverage beginning in 1991.23 Due to a number of reasons, including a
major increase in cost estimates and opposition to a supplemental premium
charge to higher income beneficiaries, the MCCA was repealed before it
17 Id. § 1395i-2(a)(1).
8 Id. § 1395d-(a)(1). Payroll tax contributions to the Medicare trust fund primarily
finance Part A. Id.
19 Id. § 1395k. General tax revenues and enrollee premiums primarily finance Part B.
See id. § 1395j.
20 JENNIFER O'SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG
COVERAGE FOR BENEFICIARIES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 1 (2003); Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services, Overview, http://cms.hhs.gov/aboutihistory/ssachr.asp (last visited Feb.
26, 2006).
21 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, supra note 20.
22 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
23 Id. "Catastrophic" coverage would cover the full costs of medications once the
beneficiary reached a specified amount of out-of-pocket drug expenses, often referred to as
the catastrophic limit or out-of-pocket limit. The benefit under the MCCA was to cover all
outpatient medicine expenses above a deductible amount of $600 (in the first year), subject
to a 50% coinsurance cost. The deductible for future years was indexed so that 16.8% of
Medicare beneficiaries would have prescription drug costs that met the deductible each year.
The coinsurance was also scheduled to be progressively lowered to 20% by 1993. Id.
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even began. 4 The second major attempt to add Medicare prescription drug
coverage came as part of the Clinton administration's comprehensive health
care reform package in 1993. Introduced in Congress as the Health
Security Act,25 the Clinton plan called for the addition of a prescription drug
benefit to Medicare.26 However, after months of extensive hearings and
debate, the Clinton proposal failed to generate enough support to make it to
the floor of either house of Congress for a vote.27
Despite the failure to add prescription drugs as a basic Medicare
benefit, Medicare beneficiaries were eventually permitted to purchase
supplemental benefits, called Medigap plans, that provided beneficiaries
with extra coverage for additional services (including prescription drugs). 28
In addition to Medigap, Medicare Part C allowed seniors to opt out of
traditional fee-for-service Medicare through enrollment in privately
operated managed care plans, called Medicare+Choice plans.2 9 Some Part
C enrollees received additional benefits not included in traditional fee-for-
service Medicare, including prescription drug coverage.3 °  However,
Medicare+Choice plans typically required patients to choose a primary care
physician from a list of plan-approved doctors, and often mandated plan
approval in order to see a specialist.3' Furthermore, since many of the plans
faced financial difficulties, some plan operators chose to discontinue
24 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103 Stat.
1979.
25 Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993); Health Security Act, S.
1757, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993).
26 Id. The Clinton plan would have included a $250 deductible and a 20% coinsurance
cost, with Medicare picking up the remaining 80% of beneficiaries' drug costs above the
deductible amount. Id. The proposed benefit also included an out-of-pocket limit of $1,000.
Id.
27 See Dana Priest, Democrats Pull the Plug on Health Care Reform, WASH. POST, Sept.
27, 1994, at Al; Dana Priest, Where Health Care Reform Effort Failed; Some Officials
Blame White House as Plan Appears Dead for Year, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1994, at Al.
28 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss (2000). Services available through Medigap varied by plan, and
only some Medigap plans provided drug coverage. However, some seniors found these
plans either unaffordable or altogether unavailable. See THE LEWIN GROUP, RESTRICTING
UNDERWRITING AND PREMIUM RATING PRACTICES IN THE MEDIGAP MARKET: THE
EXPERIENCE OF THREE STATES 11-21 (2001), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/
health/200 1 01 medigap.pdf.
29 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(a).
30 Id. § 1395w-21(a)(1)(B).
31 See GERALDINE DALLEK, CONSUMER PROTECTIONS IN MEDICARE+CHOICE (1998),
available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/1449-protection.cfm.
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coverage in certain geographic markets, leaving many beneficiaries without
32Part C coverage.
The MMA makes sweeping changes to the Medicare program by
establishing a new Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit. 33 Effective
January 1, 2006, the Part D program provides Medicare coverage and
reimbursement for prescription drugs dispensed on an outpatient basis.
34
Any individual entitled to coverage under Medicare Part A or enrolled in
Medicare Part B will be eligible to obtain Part D coverage of outpatient
prescription drugs effective January 1, 2006.35 The basic Part D benefit will
cover insulin, vaccines, certain biological products, and any other
medically-necessary drugs not currently covered under Medicare that are:
(a) dispensed according to a prescription; (b) administered on an outpatient
basis; and (c) mandated Medicaid-covered drugs. 36
Medicare beneficiaries are not required to elect coverage under Part
D. 37 However, if they do wish to obtain Part D benefits they must enroll in
32 See TIMOTHY LAKE & RANDALL BROWN, MEDICARE+CHOICE WITHDRAWALS:
UNDERSTANDING KEY FACTORS 10-11 (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/
6046-index.cfm; see also Robert A. Berenson, Medicare+Choice: Doubling or
Disappearing?, HEALTH AFF., Nov. 28, 2001, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/content/full/ hlthaff.w1.65v I/DC 1.
33 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101-52. On January 28, 2005, the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") within HHS published a final
regulation to implement the Part D program. Medicare Program, Medicare Prescription
Drug Benefit, 70 Fed. Reg. 4193 (Jan. 28, 2005); see Volunteer Medicare Prescription Drug
Benefit, 42 C.F.R. pt. 423 (2005). In addition, CMS has compiled Part D implementation
guidance on its website. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Prescription Drug
Coverage - General Information, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovGenln/ (last
visited Jan. 27, 2006).
34 Until then, Medicare beneficiaries could receive assistance with their outpatient
prescription drug costs beginning in June 2004 through the implementation of a prescription
drug discount card program. During the two-year period before the Part D drug benefit took
effect, a Discount Card Program provided enrollees with access to negotiated discounted
prices for prescription drugs. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
Medicare Drug Discount Cards Continue to Drop Prices and Offer Better Savings, (May 14,
2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter = 1049.
3' 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101.
36 Id. § 1395w-102.
37 The Bush Administration has maintained that Part D will provide Medicare
beneficiaries maximum flexibility by allowing them to choose their optimal plan. Press
Release, President George W. Bush, Keeping Our Promise to America's Seniors: President
Signs Medicare Legislation (Dec. 8 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/12/20031208-2.html. President Bush stated,
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either: (1) a qualified prescription drug plan ("PDP"); or (2) an existing
Medicare Advantage ("MA") plan that includes prescription drug coverage
("MA-PD") (PDP and MA-PD are referred to collectively as "Plans").
38
Medicare prescription drug coverage under Part D will be administered
through the Plans. Each Plan must enter into a contract with HHS to
provide Part D covered drugs.3 9 Plans must meet numerous design
requirements, including the ability to: ensure beneficiary access to a
sufficient network of pharmacies; provide beneficiaries with access to
negotiated prices for covered outpatient prescription drugs; establish cost-
effective utilization management programs and quality assurance measures
(including a medication therapy management program); meet patient safety
and the quality standards; and meet detailed statutory and regulatory
standards with respect to the prescription drug coverage offered, the setting
of premiums, enrollment periods and late enrollment penalties. 40  A
beneficiary must be given the opportunity to choose between at least two
qualifying Plans offered by at least two different entities in the region
where the beneficiary resides. 4' Enrollment in approved Plans began on
November 15, 2005.42 Although participation in Part D is voluntary,
eligible beneficiaries enrolling after May 15, 2006 could be subject to
higher premiums.43 Generally, Medicare will reimburse Plans for providing
Every senior needs to know if you don't want to change your current coverage, you don't have to
change. You're the one in charge. If you keep your Medicare the way it is, along with the new
prescription benefit, that is your right ....
... For the seniors of America, more choices and more control will mean better health care.
Id.
38 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395w-101. A PDP is a stand-alone insurance benefit offered by a
private entity licensed to offer health insurance under state law. An MA plan is a
comprehensive managed care program analogous to the former Medicare Part C
(Medicare+Choice) program. MA plans not only provide the same range of services
available to recipients collectively enrolled in Parts A, B and D, but also may offer
additional benefits not featured in Parts A, B, and D.
'9 Id. § 1395w-111.
4 Id. §§ 1395w-111-12.
41 Medicare beneficiaries will be able to choose from at least two plans (one of which
must be a PDP), but many more choices will be available in most areas. Id. § 1395w-
102(a). Peter Young, Medicare Prescription Drug benefit, CURRENT SOC. SEC. NEWS, Oct.
2005, at 4. Under the MMA, if adequate private market options fail to materialize then
government officials may supplement regions that are not adequately covered by the private
market with additional coverage to ensure that each geographic region features a minimum
of two prescription drug plans. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395w-103(a).
42 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395w-101(b)(2).
41 Id § 1395w-1 13(b); 42 C.F.R. § 423.38 (2005); see also H.R. Rep. No. 108-391, at 9-
11, 39-41 (2003) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1407, 2073-75, 2102, 2104.
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drug coverage on a per enrollee basis (although other reimbursement
methodologies exist).
Plans contract with drug manufacturers to purchase drugs directly from
the manufacturers for their Part D enrollees. The Plans (and not HHS) will
negotiate for discounts from the manufacturers on behalf of Medicare
beneficiaries. 4  In turn, Plans will contract with prescription drug
managers, pharmacies or other providers to dispense medications to Part D
enrollees.45 Plans must include in their network "any willing pharmacy"
meeting the Plan's standard terms and conditions.46 It will be up to the
Plans to determine the discounts and reimbursement rates that pharmacies
will receive.47 Since being an enrolled provider in the traditional Medicare
Part A or Part B programs does not impart Part D billing privileges, the
pharmacy must have a contractual relationship with a Plan to bill and
receive payment from the Plan for an individual's Part D covered
prescription drugs.48 This is true whether or not the pharmacy is enrolled in
the fee-for-service Medicare program and billing for Medicare Part B
covered drugs.49
Pursuant to the MMA, standard coverage under Part D features a
number of beneficiary premiums, co-payments, and coverage gaps. 50 The
law does not specify a monthly premium amount that beneficiaries will be
required to pay, thus allowing individual Plans the discretion to determine
premium amounts. Some national and regional Medicare Part D
' 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111(i); H.R. REP. No. 108-391, at 35 (2003) (Conf. Rep.),
reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2098.
45 Id.
46 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(1)(A).
47 Id. § 1395w-104(b).
48 Central to the Part D program is the MMA's "noninterference" provision, which
expressly prohibits CMS from (1) interfering with negotiations among drug manufacturers,
PDPs, and pharmacies, (2) requiring PDPs to use a particular formulary, or (3) instituting a
price structure for the reimbursement of drugs provided under Part D. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395-
111(i). This provision is intended to stimulate competition and provide Medicare
beneficiaries and the Medicare program the benefit of any discounts that the Plans are able to
obtain through private negotiations. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 108-391, at 461 (2003); 149
CONG. REc. S 15,886 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
49 For example, a pharmacy may currently receive payment under Medicare Part B for an
individual's covered drug, albuterol, delivered through a nebulizer, which is considered to be
durable medical equipment ("DME"). The pharmacy bills the Medicare DME carrier for this
drug pursuant to Part B. The same individual has joined a PDP and has coverage of
albuterol delivered through a metered dose inhaler (which is not considered DME under Part
B). The pharmacy can only bill the MA-PD or PDP under Part D for covered albuterol
delivered through a metered dose inhaler if the pharmacy has a contractual relationship with
that MA-PD or PDP.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(a)(2)(A)(i)(1).
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prescription drug plans will use a combination of lower premiums and
higher copays or coinsurance on certain drugs as part of their strategy to
attract beneficiaries. This strategy, they hope, will help them grab market
share and give them greater leverage in negotiating prices with
pharmaceutical manufacturers. However, the Congressional Budget Office
("CBO") estimates the average monthly premiums will be $35 in 2006,
rising to $58 by 2013 .5 1 This is in addition to the standard premium for
Medicare Part B.
In 2006, the annual deductible for standard Part D coverage is $250.52
Once the beneficiary meets the annual deductible, the Plan will cover 75%
of drug costs incurred between $251 to $2,250. The beneficiary generally
will be responsible for the remaining 25% of the costs. Once the $2,250
coverage limit is met, the beneficiary will be solely responsible for paying
all of the next $2,850 in potentially covered drug costs.5 3 In other words,
no coverage will be provided beyond the $2,250 initial coverage limit until
the beneficiary reaches $3,600 in out-of-pocket costs for 2006 (i.e., $250
deductible + $500 total co-payments for drug costs up to the initial $2,250
coverage limit + $2,850). This coverage gap is typically known as the
"donut hole." Thus, when beneficiaries are in the donut hole, they must pay
100% of their prescription drug costs until their True Out of Pocket Costs
("TrOOP") reaches $3,600. Out-of-pocket costs exceeding $3,600 will be
covered by the Plan, except for a nominal beneficiary cost-sharing amount
equal to the greater of: (1) $2 for a generic drug or preferred multiple source
drug and $5 for any other drug, or (2) 5% co-payment. 4 The size of the
donut hole coverage gap is expected to grow each year since its upper and
lower bounds are indexed for inflation.
To assist certain low income individuals, the MMA provides a subsidy
that either reduces or eliminates a beneficiary's annual deductible, monthly
Part D premium, and out-of-pocket expenses.5 5  Low-income Medicare
beneficiaries who are also eligible for Medicaid (so-called dual eligibles)
lose Medicaid drug coverage on January 1, 2006, but will be enrolled
51 Id. § 1395w-113(a); see also REP. PETE STARK, JOINT ECON. COMM. DEMOCRATS, THE
NEW MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG ACT: INDEXING EFFECT ERODES BENEFIT 2 (2004). This
brief cites a CBO study which projects that the average premium for a Part D PDP plan will
be $35 per month in 2006. Furthermore, the CBO study projects that over the next decade
per capita drug spending will increase by about 8.5% annually. Thus, taking these two
findings together, the CBO estimates monthly premium will reach $58 by 2013.
52 Id. § 1395w-102(b)(1)(A).
53 id.
14 Id. § 1395w-102(b)(4)(A)(i).
55 Id. § 1395w-i 14(a)(1). Assistance is available on a sliding scale with the maximum
income for eligibility of 150% of the federal poverty line. Id. § 1395w-I 14(a)(2)(A).
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automatically in a Medicare Part D Plan and the federal government will
subsidize their out-of-pocket costs detailed above.56 State Medicaid
programs will share in the costs of providing prescription drug coverage to
dual eligibles under Part D.57  Finally, employers who maintain retiree
health plans that offer actuarially equivalent prescription drug coverage will
receive a 28% subsidy for drug expenses between $250 and $5100.58
III. FEDERAL HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS ANTI-KICKBACK LAW
A. STATUTORY PROHIBITION
The Anti-Kickback Statute provides criminal and civil penalties for
whoever:
(1)... knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (including any
kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for
the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in
part under a Federal Health Care Program, or (B) in return for purchasing, leasing,
ordering, or arranging for or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any
good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under a Federal Health Care Program[;] 59 [or]
(2)... knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including any
kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind
to any person to induce such person (A) to refer an individual to a person for the
furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under a Federal Health Care Program, or (B) to
purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing, or ordering
56 Id. § 1396u-5.
57 Dual eligibles with incomes below 100% of the federal poverty level will have no
premium costs and no initial coverage limit. They will pay copayments of $3 for brand
name drugs and $1 for generics up to the catastrophic limit ($5,100 in total drug spending)
and no copays thereafter. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 108-391, at 44-45, reprinted in 2003
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2107-08. Beneficiaries whose incomes fall below 135% of poverty and
who also meet an assets test ($6,000 per individual!$9,000 per couple) will pay $5 for brand
name drugs and $2 for generic, with no deductible, no premium costs, and no cost-sharing
beyond the catastrophic limit. Id. Those beneficiaries who have incomes between 135-
150% of the federal poverty level and meet an assets test ($10,000 per individual/ $20,000
per couple) will be required to pay a $50 deductible, a sliding scale premium, and a 15%
copayment up to the catastrophic limit, with copayments of $5 and $2 thereafter. Id. at 45-
46.
58 Id. at 63; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-132.
'9 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1).
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any good, facility, service, or item for which gayment may be made in whole or in
part under a Federal Health Care Program ....
Violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute can result in severe criminal
and civil penalties. The DOJ is responsible for criminal enforcement of the
statute. Each violation of the statute is a felony punishable upon conviction
by up to five years imprisonment and/or fines of up to $25,000.61 The OIG
is responsible for civil enforcement of the statute. The OIG has the
authority to exclude an individual or entity from participation in an FHCP
(e.g., Medicare, Medicaid) if the OIG determines that the individual or
entity has violated the statute. The exclusion remedy may be imposed by
the OIG pursuant to an administrative proceeding and absent a criminal
conviction or investigation. 6' Finally, a violation of the statute constitutes
grounds for imposition of a civil monetary penalty ("CMP") and other civil
monetary assessments.63
The statute contains a number of exceptions that describe certain
practices that are immune from either criminal or civil prosecution.
Statutory exceptions exist for, among other things: (1) discounts or other
reductions in price obtained by a provider of services or other entity under a
FHCP if the reduction in price is properly disclosed and appropriately
reflected in the costs claimed or charges made by the provider or entity to a
FHCP; 64 (2) any amount paid by an employer to a bonafide employee for
employment in the provision of items or services reimbursable under a
FHCP; 65 and (3) any amount paid by a vendor of goods or services to a
6 Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(2). The term "Federal Health Care Program" ("FHCP") is defined
as: (1) any plan or program, other than the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, that
provides health benefits either directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is funded
directly, in whole or in part, by the United States government (e.g., Medicare, the Civilian
Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services ("CHAMPUS"), Department of
Veterans Affairs health programs); and (2) any "State Health Care Program," defined as a
state program funded under United States Code Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter XIX (i.e.,
Medicaid), Subchapter V (i.e., Maternal and Child Health), or Subchapter XX (Social
Services Block Grants). Id. § 1320a-7b(f)(1) (definition of Federal Health Care Program);
id § 1320a-7(h) (definition of State Health Care Program).
61 Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(l)-(2).
62 Id § 1320a-7(b)(7); Fraud and Kickbacks and Other Prohibited Activities, 42 C.F.R. §
1001.951 (2005).
63 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a). Specifically, for each violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute,
a party is subject to a $50,000 CMP, plus an assessment of up to three times the total amount
of remuneration offered, paid, solicited, or received in violation of the Anti-Kickback
Statute. Id.
64 Id § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(A).
65 Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B).
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purchasing agent acting for a group of individuals or entities who furnish
services reimbursed under a FHCP.66
B. SAFE HARBOR REGULATIONS
Congress recognized that the Anti-Kickback Statute's broad language
had the potential to create confusion in the health care industry regarding
the legality of many commonplace business arrangements. Consequently,
in 1987 Congress expressly directed HHS to promulgate regulations
defining certain payment practices that would not violate the law.67 These
regulations have become popularly known as "safe harbors," since parties
who structure their business arrangements to satisfy all the criteria of an
applicable safe harbor are sheltered from liability under the anti-kickback
law. 6
The safe harbor regulations do not purport to represent the only types
of arrangements that are permissible under the Anti-Kickback Statute. In
other words, the failure of an arrangement to meet all of the criteria of an
applicable safe harbor does not necessarily mean that the arrangement
violates the statute. In the preamble to the final safe harbor regulations
issued in 1991, the OIG states that the failure of an arrangement to qualify
for a safe harbor can mean one of three things:
First,. .. it may mean that the arrangement does not fall within the ambit of the
statute. In other words, the arrangement is not intended to induce the referral of
business reimbursable under [a Federal Health Care Program]; so there is no reason to
comply with the safe harbor standards, and no risk of prosecution. Second, at the
other end of the spectrum, the arrangement could be a clear statutory violation and
also not qualify for safe harbor protection. In that case, assuming the arrangement is
obviously abusive, prosecution would be very likely. Third, the arrangement may
violate the statute in a less serious manner, although not be in compliance with a safe
harbor provision. Here there is no way to predict the degree of risk. Rather, the
degree of the risk depends on an evaluation of the many factors which are part of the
• 69
decision-making process regarding case selection for investigation and prosecution.
Where a particular practice "falls within the ambit of the statute" and
does not qualify for a safe harbor, the OIG and DOJ will consider a variety
of factors in determining whether the arrangement is abusive and a
66 Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(C).
67 Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-93, § 14, 101 Stat. 680, 697-98.
68 The OIG published an initial set of final safe harbors in July 1991. Medicare and State
Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg.
35,952 (July 29, 1991); see 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2005).
69 Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; O1G Anti-Kickback
Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,954.
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candidate for investigation and prosecution. Specifically, consideration is
given to: (1) the potential for increased charges or reported costs to a
FHCP; (2) the possible encouragement of overutilization; (3) the potential
for adversely affecting competition by freezing competing suppliers out of
the marketplace; and (4) patient freedom of choice.7 0  No one factor is
dispositive, and the OIG and DOJ have considerable discretion in bringing
enforcement actions.
C. OIG SPECIAL FRAUD ALERTS AND ADVISORY OPINIONS
The OIG has issued a number of "Special Fraud Alerts" to identify
certain practices that may violate the Anti-Kickback Statute. Although
Special Fraud Alerts are not regulations having the force of law, they are
significant since they offer insight into the OIG's enforcement priorities and
provide the OIG's interpretation of the Anti-Kickback Statute as applied to
various factual situations. 7' Special Fraud Alerts have been issued to
address the application of the Anti-Kickback Statute to a number of areas,
including joint venture arrangements, routine waivers of beneficiary
copayment and deductible obligations under Part B of the Medicare
program, hospital incentives to physicians, prescription drug marketing
practices, and clinical laboratory arrangements.7 2
The OIG is also required to issue written advisory opinions to private
parties in response to requests regarding whether existing or proposed
transactions violate the Anti-Kickback Statute.73 Advisory opinions will
address, among other things, what constitutes "remuneration" under the
Anti-Kickback Statute and whether an arrangement satisfies the criteria for
70 Id. at 35,954, 35,956, 35,978; see United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 n.9
(7th Cir. 1980).
71 See Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alert, 64 Fed. Reg. 1813 (Jan. 12, 1999);
Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alert, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,415 (Apr. 24, 1998); Publication of
OIG Special Fraud Alert, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,623 (June 17, 1996); Publication of OIG Special
Fraud Alert, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,847 (Aug. 10, 1995); Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alert,
59 Fed. Reg. 65,372 (Dec. 19, 1994) (setting forth previously issued Special Fraud Alerts).
72 Special Fraud Alert: Arrangements for the Provision of Clinical Lab Services, 59 Fed.
Reg. 65,377 (Oct. 1994); Special Fraud Alert: Prescription Drug Marketing Schemes, 59
Fed. Reg. 65,376 (Aug. 1994); Special Fraud Alert: Hospital Incentives to Physicians, 59
Fed. Reg. 65,375 (May 1992); Special Fraud Alert: Routine Waiver of Copayments or
Deductibles Under Medicare Part B, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,374 (May 1991); Special Fraud Alert:
Joint Venture Arrangements, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,373 (Aug. 1989).
73 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, §
205, 110 Stat. 2000 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b), which requires the issuance of
advisory opinions by the OIG). The OIG has issued a rule specifying the process for seeking
an advisory opinion. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Issuance
of Advisory Opinions by the OIG, 63 Fed. Reg. 38,311, 38,324 (July 16, 1998).
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a statutory exception or a regulatory safe harbor.74 However, advisory
opinions will not address questions involving the intent of parties to an
arrangement, the fair market value of goods, services, or property, or
whether an individual is a bona fide employee.75
D. CASE LAW
Federal case law has provided broad interpretations of the Anti-
Kickback Statute. The statute has been held applicable to a wide variety of
relationships that are quite different from an obvious kickback for a patient
referral or a bribe to recommend the purchase of specific items or services.
Federal courts and administrative bodies considering the statute in the
context of actual enforcement proceedings have established several
important interpretive principles:
The statute is violated if even "one purpose" (as opposed to
the sole or primary purpose) of a payment is in exchange for or
to induce the referral of patients or the ordering, purchasing, or
recommending of items or services, although it may be a
defense that an improper purpose was "incidental," "minor,"
or not "material.,
76
* Although some financial benefits may be too remote or de
minimis to affect referral practices, the threshold appears to be
relatively low; a payment or other benefit may violate the
statute when the amount is sufficient to influence the
customer's reason or judgment;77
74 DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., RECOMMENDED PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS AND
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR ADDRESSING REQUESTS FOR OIG ADVISORY OPINIONS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 1 128D OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AND 42 CFR PART 1008,
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/ prequestions.htm.
75 Matters Subject to Advisory Opinions, 42 C.F.R. § 1008.5 (2004); Medicare and State
Health Care Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. 7350, 7351 (Feb. 19, 1997).
76 See United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989) (approving a jury
instruction that guilt could be found "if you find beyond reasonable doubt that one of the
material purposes for the solicitation was to obtain money for the referral of services")
(emphasis added); United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874
F.2d 20, 30 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the "issue of the sole versus primary reason for
payments is irrelevant since any amount of inducement is illegal," but also approving a jury
instruction that prohibited conviction if the improper purpose was "incidental" or "minor");
United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 72 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that "[i]f the payments were
intended to induce the physician to use [defendant's] services, the statute was violated, even
if the payments were also intended to compensate for professional services"), rev 'd on other
grounds, United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
77 Inspector General v. Hanlester Network, Dec. No. 1275 (HHS Departmental Appeals
Bd., Appellate Div., Sept. 18, 1991) at 57 & n.34, reprinted in [1992-1 Transfer Binder]
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0 Giving a potential referral source the opportunity to earn a fee
that exceeds the reasonable value of any services provided (or
return on investment made) will constitute evidence that the
payment is unlawful; however, even if the fee earned is
reasonable in amount, this in itself will not serve as a defense
if the intent underlying the arrangement can be shown to be an
exchange of payment for referrals;78
* There need be no proof of an agreement to make referrals, or
to order, purchase, or recommend medical items or services,
for illegal intent and a violation to be found; intent may be
inferred from the circumstances of the case;
79
• The mere potential for increased costs to, or a payment to be
made by, an FHCP may be enough to violate the law; no
actual payout by an FHCP is necessary as long as the
challenged remuneration is for an item or service that could be
paid for by an FHCP; 80 and
• The fact that a particular arrangement is common in the health
care industry is not a defense to an Anti-Kickback Statute
violation.8'
Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 39,566 at 27,763, no. 34, on remand, Doc. C-448,
Dec. No. CR181 (HHS Departmental Appeals Bd., Civil Remedies Div., Mar. 10, 1992),
reprinted in [ 1992-2 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 40,064, aff'd in
part and rev 'd in part, Dec. No. 1347 (HHS Departmental Appeals Bd., Appellate Div. July
24, 1992), reprinted in id. at 40,406B, aff'd sub nom. Hanlester Network v. Sullivan, No.
CV 92-4552-LHM, 1993 WL 78299 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom., Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
78 Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d at 29; United States v.
Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1985).
79 Hanlester Network, Dec. No. 1275 39,566 at 27,740, 27,748, 27,759, 27,763.
80 United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1980).
"I Hanlester Network, [1992-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
39,566 at 27,763. In 1995, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a violation of the
Anti-Kickback Statute cannot be found absent a showing that the defendant both: (1) knew
that the law prohibited giving or receiving remuneration for referrals, and (2) acted with a
specific intent to violate the law. See Hanlester Network, 51 F.3d at 1400. However, several
courts in other jurisdictions have declined to follow this approach. See, e.g., United States v.
Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 838 (11 th Cir. 1998) (finding that Anti-Kickback Statute is not a
highly technical regulation "that poses a danger of ensnaring persons engaged in apparently
innocent conduct"); United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 440-41 (8th Cir. 1996)
(distinguishing Hanlester as an administrative debarment proceeding and rejecting
application of the main case on which the Hanlester court relied); United States v. Neufeld,
908 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (declining to follow Hanlester), affd, 149 F.3d
1185 (6th Cir. 1998); Med. Dev. Network, Inc. v. Prof 1 Respiratory Care/Home Med.
Equip. Serv., Inc., 673 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("[The statute] is directed
at punishment of those who perform specific acts and does not require that one engage in the
ROBERT N RABECS
IV. ANALYSIS
Each year, Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in the Part D program will
be responsible for paying 100% of eligible drug costs during the donut hole
period. The payment of these expenses is required before Part D
catastrophic coverage is triggered (which will cover most of any additional
82drug costs for the remainder of the year). 2 Many beneficiaries may have
difficulty paying drug expenses during the donut hole period, and these
beneficiaries may not qualify for government subsidies under Part D.
Plans will have an obvious financial incentive to keep beneficiaries in
the donut hole because the Plans will not incur any payment responsibility
during this time.83 In this regard, the OIG's Lew Morris has stated that
"[t]here will certainly be some financial pressure for Plans to keep
beneficiaries in this hole, where the plan has no reimbursement
obligations. 8 4
Conversely, pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacies contracting
with Plans have an incentive to move patients through the donut hole
quickly since doing so will trigger catastrophic coverage, which could result
in increased usage and Plan reimbursement of covered medications. In
other words, during the catastrophic coverage period, pharmacies will be
able to seek reimbursement directly from the Plans for dispensed
medications (other than negligible copayments amounts collected from
enrollees). Furthermore, without having to incur any significant cost-
sharing obligations during the catastrophic coverage period, enrollees will
have no disincentive to continue taking Part D eligible medications for
chronic conditions (and their physicians will have no disincentive to
continue prescribing such medications).
prohibited conduct with the specific intent to violate the statute."); cf United States v. Davis,
132 F.3d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[E]ven the Hanlester court requires knowledge only
that the conduct in question was unlawful, and not necessarily knowledge of which particular
statute makes the conduct unlawful.").
82 As noted above, Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in a Plan offering the standard benefit
must pay an annual deductible of $250 and 25% of initial drug costs up to $2,250. See supra
note 52 and accompanying text. After that level is reached, beneficiaries will be responsible
for paying 100% of the prescription drug costs while they are in the donut hole-the zone in
the drug cost coverage continuum between where Medicare coverage stops and catastrophic
coverage begins after the beneficiary has paid an additional $2,850, for a total of $3,600 in
out-of-pocket expenses. After that, the government will pay 95% of all prescription drug
costs.
83 In other words, during the time a beneficiary is in the donut hole, the beneficiary will
be responsible for paying 100% of their eligible drug costs. Plans, therefore, will not incur
any payment obligation during this time.
84 Enforcement Officials Detail Weapons, Concerns Posed by Rx Benefit, supra note 6
(quoting Lewis Morris).
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An issue that has arisen is whether pharmacies and drug manufacturers
can assist beneficiaries with their Part D cost-sharing obligations,
particularly while enrollees are in the donut hole. In other words, in what
manner can companies assist enrollees in meeting their TrOOP expenses in
order to make the enrollees eligible for Part D catastrophic coverage (which
takes effect after a patient has incurred $3,600 in TrOOP for 2006)? This
question is significant because CMS has made clear in the final rule
implementing the Part D program that assistance provided on behalf of a
beneficiary by any person or organization (other than insurers, group health
plans or similar third party payers) will count towards an enrollee's required
TrOOP expenses.
85
The manner in which manufacturers or pharmacies assist Part D
enrollees in meeting TrOOP and passing through the donut hole will
implicate the Anti-Kickback Statute and, therefore, could subject
manufacturers and pharmacies to government scrutiny and enforcement
action. In fact, the OIG's Lew Morris has said that the OIG will be on the
lookout for scams aimed at inflating a person's out-of-pocket expenses to
move them through the donut hole more quickly.86 The type of possible
assistance offered to enrollees by drug manufacturers and pharmacies could
vary. Among other things, pharmacies may seek to waive beneficiary cost-
sharing obligations for covered medications, while drug manufacturers may
seek to offer direct subsidies or free medications to enrollees. When a
pharmacy waives cost-sharing obligations, or a drug manufacturer provides
assistance with cost-sharing obligations, the Anti-Kickback Statute is
implicated because such assistance could be viewed as an inducement for
the enrollee to use that pharmacy and/or the manufacturer's products. In
other words, such assistance could present an opportunity for abuse if it
inappropriately influences the use of provider or the purchase of drugs by
Part D enrollees.
A. PHARMACY COST-SHARING WAIVERS
In an effort to help Part D enrollees who cannot afford to pay part or
all of the $3,600 true out-of-pocket costs, pharmacies may be inclined to
waive enrollee cost-sharing obligations. As a general matter, remuneration
under the Anti-Kickback Statute "includes the waiver of coinsurance and
85 Benefits and Beneficiaries Protection, 42 C.F.R. § 423.100 (2005); Coordination of
Benefits, 42 C.F.R. § 423.464 (2005); see Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 4193, 4239 (Jan. 28,
2005); Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,631, 46,650 (Aug. 3, 2004).
86 HHS OIG to Expand Use of Administrative Sanctions for Receiving, Seeking
Kickbacks, supra note 14.
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deductible amounts (or any part thereof)."8 7 In 1991, the OIG issued a
Special Fraud Alert which identified the health fraud implications of
providers routinely waiving Medicare beneficiary copayment and
deductible obligations.8 8 At first glance, it may appear that routine waiver
of copayments and deductibles helps Medicare beneficiaries. However, if
patients are required to pay even a small portion of their care, they may
become better health care consumers, and select items or services because
they are medically needed, rather than simply because they are free. 9
Ultimately, if Medicare pays more for an item or service than it should, or if
it pays for unnecessary items or services, there are less Medicare funds
available to pay for truly needed services. 90
According to the Special Fraud Alert, "[w]hen providers, practitioners
or suppliers forgive [patients'] financial obligations for reasons other than
genuine financial hardship of the particular patient, they may be unlawfully
inducing that patient to purchase items or services from them[,]" in
violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. 9' Thus, a good faith effort should
be made to collect deductibles and copayments in most cases; however, it is
permissible to forgive a particular patient's copayment and deductible
obligations based upon a showing of financial hardship.92 The Special
Fraud Alert identifies certain practices which indicate that providers,
practitioners, or suppliers are routinely waiving Medicare deductibles and
copayments:
advertisements which state "Medicare accepted as payment in full," "insurance
accepted as payment in full," or "no out-of-pocket expense"; routine use of "financial
hardship" forms which state that the beneficiary is unable to pay the
coinsurance/deductible amounts (i.e., there is no good faith attempt to determine the
87 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6) (2000). Additionally, the routine waiver of cost-sharing
obligations of Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries who are enrollees of health plans
potentially violates the federal Civil Monetary Penalties law. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7a(a)(5) provides for the imposition of civil monetary penalties against anyone who:
[o]ffers to or transfers remuneration to any individual eligible for benefits under [federal health
care programs (including Medicare or Medicaid)] that such person knows or should know is
likely to influence such individual to order or receive from a particular provider, practitioner, or
supplier any item or service for which payment may be made, in whole or in part, [by a Federal
Health Care Program].
"Remuneration," for purposes of this prohibition, is expressly defined to include the routine
waiver of coinsurance and deductible amounts (or any part thereof). Id. § 1320a-7a(i)(6).
88 Routine Waiver, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,374 (Aug. 1989).
89 See Evan Melhado, Economists, Public Provision, and the Market: Changing Values
in Policy Debate, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 215, 231-32 (1998).
90 Routine Waiver, 59 Fed. Reg. at 65,374.
9' Id. at 65,375.
92 Id.
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beneficiary's actual financial condition); collection of copayments and deductibles
only where the beneficiary has Medicare supplemental insurance coverage [that pays
the copayments and deductibles]; higher charges to Medicare beneficiaries than those
made to other persons in order to offset the waiver of coinsurance; failure to collect
copayments or deductibles for a specific group of Medicare patients for reasons
unrelated to indigency (e.g., a supplier waives coinsurance or deductible obligations
for all patients from a particular hospital. . . .); and sham insurance programs which
cover copayments or deductibles only for items and services provided by the entity
offering the insurance, where the premium is insignificant (e.g., $1/month) and not
based on actuarial risks.
93
Significantly, given the OIG's position with regard to cost-sharing
waivers, the MMA added the following statutory exception to the Anti-
Kickback Statute prohibitions:
the waiver or reduction by pharmacies (including pharmacies of the Indian Health
Service, Indian tribes, tribal organizations, and urban Indian organizations) of any
cost-sharing imposed under Part D of subchapter XVIII of [this chapter], if the
conditions described in clauses (i) through (iii) of section [1320a-7a(i)(6)(A) of this
title] are met with respect to the waiver or reduction (except that, in the case of such a
waiver or reduction on behalf of a subsidy eligible individual (as defined in section
[1395w-i14(a)(3) of this title]), section [1320a-7a(i)(6)(A) of this title] shall be
applied without regard to clauses (ii) and (iii) of that section).
This exception essentially permits pharmacies to waive or reduce cost-
sharing amounts for Part D enrollees, provided certain conditions are met. 95
Any cost-sharing waivers must be provided in an unadvertised, non-routine
manner.96  Furthermore, the waiver should only be granted after the
pharmacy has either: (i) determined that the enrollee in question is
financially needy, or (ii) failed to collect the cost-sharing amount despite
reasonable collection efforts. 97  Thus, cost-sharing waivers which are
offered to Part D enrollees on a routine or advertised basis or provided
93 Id. (emphasis added).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(G) (2000). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6),
[t]he term "remuneration" does not include
(A) the waiver of coinsurance and deductible amounts by a person, if
(i) the waiver is not offered as part of any advertisement or solicitation;
(ii) the person does not routinely waive coinsurance or deductible amounts; and
(iii) the person
(1) waives the coinsurance and deductible amounts after determining in good faith
that the individual is in financial need, or
(II) fails to collect coinsurance or deductible amounts after making reasonable
collection efforts.
9' Id § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(G).
96 Id, § 1320a-7a(i)(6).
9' Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(G).
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where enrollees are in the donut hole (and without regard to the enrollees'
ability to pay) would be problematic under the Anti-Kickback Statute and a
potential enforcement target.
B. MANUFACTURER PATIENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
If a Medicare Part D enrollee cannot afford to pay the $3,600 TrOOP
amount, and a pharmacy does not waive the cost-sharing amount, then the
enrollee may seek assistance from other sources. In this regard, there is
nothing in the Part D program or any OIG regulations that prevents
Medicare beneficiaries from seeking outside assistance in meeting their
cost-sharing obligations. However, some types of cost-sharing assistance,
particularly assistance provided by drug manufacturers, may be problematic
under the Anti-Kickback Statute. Specifically, if the cost-sharing assistance
comes directly or indirectly from a drug company that stands to benefit
from the beneficiary's use of its drug, the Anti-Kickback Statute will be
implicated.
Historically, many pharmaceutical companies have operated Patient
Assistance Programs ("PAPs") designed for low-income individuals who
do not have insurance and need help with high drug costs. 98 Generally,
PAPs have provided cash subsidies and/or free or discounted drugs for
financially needy individuals. Some PAPs are affiliated with
pharmaceutical manufacturers, while others are independent charitable
organizations. Typically, in order to be eligible for free products under the
PAP, a patient must have either no health insurance coverage or no
prescription drug coverage. Before passage of MMA, the OIG had very
little interest in PAPs that provided free drugs directly to uninsured patients
because there were no FHCP dollars involved. In other words, prior to
enactment of the Part D program, PAPs raised few legal issues under the
Anti-Kickback Statute, in part because there was no involvement by FHCPs
(or any other payers). Consequently, since the free products were provided
without expectation of payment (for current or future product uses) by any
person or entity, there was no real risk of fraud or abuse to FHCPs or other
payers.
Implementation of Part D changes the enforcement landscape by
creating a new Medicare benefit to which the Anti-Kickback Statute now
applies. Many Medicare beneficiaries will now have (or be eligible for)
insurance coverage for prescription drugs who did not have coverage in the
98 See, e.g., Part D Drug Benefit: PAPs Should Not Assist Part D Enrollees, OIG Says in
Special Bulletin, 16 MEDICARE REP. (BNA) 1317 (2005); Partnership for Prescription
Assistance, http://www.pparx.org/intro.php (last visited April 6, 2006).
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past. Thus, under Part D, drug companies have a substantial financial
interest in influencing decisions pertaining to drugs covered under the
program. In this regard, it is important to understand that when a
manufacturer provides assistance to a Medicare beneficiary it could be
viewed as an inducement for the beneficiary to use that company's
products, thus implicating the Anti-Kickback Statute. In other words, a
PAP presents an opportunity for abuse if the cost-sharing subsidies are used
inappropriately to influence the purchase of drugs by Part D participants.
The Part D final regulation did not directly address the potential
application of the fraud and abuse laws to PAPs operated under Part D.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers had hoped the regulation would offer
guidance regarding how they could assist Part D enrollees in the form of
cash assistance for cost-sharing obligations and/or free product without
running afoul of the fraud and abuse laws, including the Anti-Kickback
Statute. The urgency of the guidance was necessitated by several factors:
(1) many patients who have been receiving free product through
manufacturer PAPs are now eligible for prescription drug coverage under
Part D; (2) the Part D benefit requires significant cost-sharing obligations
by enrollees, including during the donut hole when enrollees are responsible
for 100% of their drug expenses; and (3) although CMS has issued
guidance about what counts toward a patient's TrOOP under Part D, CMS
has deferred to the OIG regarding the fraud and abuse issues involved when
an entity or person other than the patient incurs the out of pocket expense
on behalf of the patient.99
On November 22, 2005 the OIG issued a Special Advisory Bulletin
("Bulletin") warning of potential fraud and abuse issues raised by PAPs for
Medicare Part D enrollees.100 The Bulletin represents the first major fraud
and abuse guidance from the OIG regarding the Part D program. The
Bulletin, titled Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees,
focuses on PAPs that are sponsored by pharmaceutical companies. 10 1 The
OIG warns that PAPs operated and controlled by pharmaceutical companies
risk running afoul of fraud and abuse laws, particularly the Anti-Kickback
Statute, if they subsidize only their own products that are reimbursable by
99 It is important to recognize the differences between CMS' authority and OIG's
authority in these matters. CMS can decide whether certain expenditures count toward
TrOOP (and related issues), but the OIG has the final say regarding the degree of risk under
the fraud and abuse laws.
100 Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for
Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,623 (Nov. 22, 2005).
101 -
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the Medicare Part D program. 102 However, cash donations to independent,
charitable PAPs that subsidize drugs regardless of the manufacturer should
not be problematic. 0 3 The specific programs addressed by the Bulletin are
discussed below.
1. Manufacturer PAPs
In the Bulletin, the OIG states that "cost-sharing subsidies provided by
pharmaceutical manufacturer PAPs pose a heightened risk of fraud and
abuse under the Federal anti-kickback statute."10 4 The OIG adds that "the
subsidies would be squarely prohibited by the statute, because the
manufacturers would be giving something of value (i.e., the subsidy) to
beneficiaries to use its product."' 0 5 In the OIG's view,
(w]here a manufacturer PAP offers subsidies tied to the use of the manufacturer's
products (often expensive drugs used by patients with chronic illnesses), the subsidies
present all of the usual risks of fraud and abuse associated with kickbacks, including
steering beneficiaries to particular drugs; increasing costs to Medicare; providing a
financial advantage over competing drugs; and reducing beneficiaries incentives to
locate and use less expensive, equally effective drugs.1
0 6
Where manufacturers use subsidies to help beneficiaries meet the
TrOOP amounts, there may be an increase in the number of patients who
use the manufacturer's product who reach the catastrophic limit. The OIG
believes that this would be problematic because reimbursement for drugs is
cost-based under the catastrophic benefit, and, in the OIG's view, cost-
based reimbursement is inherently prone to abuse because it does not
provide any incentive to limit costs.'0 7  For example, subsidies could
insulate beneficiaries from the economic effects of drug pricing, thus
eliminating a safeguard against price inflation. This potentially would
increase Medicare costs because increased prices would be reflected in
increased beneficiary subsidies and other payments made by Medicare
under Part D in subsequent years. Of equal concern to the OIG is the
potential for subsidies to lock Part D beneficiaries into the manufacturer's
product even if equally efficacious and less costly alternatives are
available.'0 8
102 Id.
103 Id. at 70,626.
'0o Id. at 70,625.
105 id.
106 Id,
107 Id. at 70,625-26; see Determination of Payments, 42 C.F.R. § 423.329 (2005).
108 Publication, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,626 (Nov. 22, 2005).
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2. Independent Charity PAPs
Although manufacturer PAPs may not provide cost-sharing assistance
to Medicare beneficiaries, the OIG historically has permitted such
assistance to be provided through independent, bona fide charitable
assistance programs.10 9  These PAPs typically are funded by several
manufacturers (and possibly other entities), but operate independently and
develop their own financial need criteria for patients to participate.
Under the Bulletin's guidelines, there are no constraints on the ability
of pharmaceutical manufacturers to support cost sharing subsidies through
cash contributions to independent, bona fide charities that do not
discriminate among different drug manufacturer products. 1 0 The Bulletin
expresses concerns with the potential for pharmaceutical companies to
create and control charitable PAPs as a way to subsidize Part D cost
sharing. To address these concerns the Bulletin reiterates guidance from
previous OIG advisory opinions for determining whether PAPs receiving
manufacturer contributions are, in fact, bona fide charities. Manufacturer
contributions to a charity will not pose Anti-Kickback Law problems if
neither the manufacturer nor any affiliates exert any direct or indirect
control or influence over the charity or the assistance program. Awards of
assistance from the charity must be made in a truly independent manner that
does not attribute the assistance to the donating manufacturer. In addition,
charitable entities are obligated to award assistance without consideration of
the manufacturer's interests and without regard to the beneficiary's choice
of product, supplier, or Part D plan. The PAP should provide assistance
based upon a reasonable, verifiable, and uniform measure of financial need
that is applied consistently. The manufacturer is not guaranteed that the
amount of its donations will correlate in any way with the number of
subsidized prescriptions for its products. In this regard, the Bulletin notes
that the manufacturer should not solicit or receive data from the PAP that
would facilitate such a correlation. In previous advisory opinions, the OIG
has recommended that manufacturers limit themselves to the receipt of
aggregate data in the form of monthly (or less frequent) reports of the total
number of applicants in a particular disease category and the number of
patients qualifying for assistance in that disease category.1
109 See, e.g., OIG Advisory Opinion 04-15 (Oct. 29, 2004); OIG Advisory Opinion 02-1
(Apr. 4, 2002).
110 Publication, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,626.
... Id. at 70,626-27; see OIG Advisory Opinion 02-1 (Apr. 4, 2002); OIG Advisory
Opinion 04-15 (Oct. 29, 2004); OIG Advisory Opinion 02-13 (Sept. 27, 2002).
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In order to fully understand the OIG's views regarding the use of
independent charities to administer PAPs, consideration should be given to
previous OIG Advisory Opinions on this model. In fact, the Bulletin
expressly references past Advisory Opinions.' 12  Taken together, these
opinions provide a useful framework for evaluating the type of PAPs that
the OIG would be likely to view favorably if they provided cost-sharing
assistance to Part D enrollees.' 
13
The OIG has issued three Advisory Opinions that address this issue.
In two of the opinions, the OIG approved the arrangements, based on the
facts presented; in the other, the OIG concluded that the arrangement
potentially violated the Anti-Kickback Statute and could be subject to
sanctions. In Advisory Opinions 02-1 and 04-15, the OIG evaluated
proposed arrangements involving independent, non-profit, charitable
organizations that provided certain patient assistance services, including
assistance with copayment obligations for prescription drugs. 114  The
organizations received funding from a variety of donors, including several
pharmaceutical manufacturers. In other words, the manufacturers pooled
their donations, and the independent foundation administered the assistance.
In these opinions, the OIG went through very similar analyses and came to
the same outcome, ultimately approving the arrangements. Several factors
appear to have been important for the OIG:
* The charitable organizations were truly independent entities,
not subject to control, directly or indirectly, by any donor that
was affiliated in any way with any pharmaceutical company;
* The charitable organizations made all financial eligibility
determinations using their own criteria, not taking into account
the identity of any physician, provider, supplier, or drug that
the patient may use, or the amount of any contribution made
by a donor whose services or products could be used;
112 Publication, 70 Fed. Reg. at 70,627 n.17.
113 It is important to note that Advisory Opinions are issued only to the requesting
parties, and technically may not be relied upon by any other individuals or entities. They are
posted on the OIG web site for informational purposes only. Moreover, the OIG frequently
points out that the opinions are limited in scope to the specific arrangements described, and
any change in facts or circumstances could change the agency's analysis. Finally, Advisory
Opinions do not bind any other government agency, including the DOJ. The DOJ has the
authority to enforce the criminal provisions of the Anti-Kickback Statute, and, while
probably unlikely, it could choose to prosecute an entity notwithstanding a positive Advisory
Opinion from the OIG.
114 OIG Advisory Opinion 04-15 (Oct. 29, 2004); OIG Advisory Opinion 02-1 (Apr. 4,
2002).
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" All patients remained free, while receiving financial
assistance, to change their health care providers, suppliers, or
products;
" The charitable organizations did not refer patients to any donor
or other provider, supplier, or product; and
• Donors were not assured that the amount of financial
assistance their patients, clients or customers received would
bear any relationship to the amount of their donations. In fact,
donors were not guaranteed that any of their patients, clients,
or customers would receive any financial assistance
whatsoever from the foundation." 5
In contrast, the OIG gave a "negative" opinion (i.e., said that sanctions
could be warranted) in Advisory Opinion 02-13.16 In that arrangement, a
single pharmaceutical company proposed to establish and fund its own non-
profit foundation that would pay all or part of the cost-sharing amounts for
financially needy patients using one of the company's products. The OIG
indicated that it would consider the foundation's grants to be payments by
the drug company itself. Importantly, the foundation's financial assistance
would be funded solely by the drug company and would be available only
to patients receiving (or willing to receive) the company's product. 17 In
summarizing its position, the OIG noted that there are non-abusive
alternatives to the proposal under consideration that could be permissible,
including: (1) the type of arrangement approved in other advisory opinions
(e.g., "in OIG Advisory Opinion No. 02-1, we approved an arrangement for
drug manufacturers to pool contributions in an independent foundation that
awards grants based on need, without reference to any specific contributing
drug manufacturer"); and (2) manufacturer PAPs in which companies
provide free drugs to financially needy beneficiaries, as long as no FHCP is
billed for the drugs. 18
There is a noteworthy discussion in the Bulletin regarding the ability
of manufacturers to "earmark" their donations for certain disease
categories.1 19  Although the Advisory Opinions had suggested that
115 OIG Advisory Opinion 04-15 (Oct. 29, 2004); OIG Advisory Opinion 02-1 (Apr. 4,
2002). This criterion suggests that there should be at least two competing drugs in the
particular disease category for which the donation is made. Otherwise, the donating
company would be assured that its donations would be used only for patients using its
product.
116 OIG Advisory Opinion 02-13 (Sept. 27, 2002).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Publication, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,626, 70,627 (Nov. 22, 2005).
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earmarking could be permissible (and this is how most independent charity
PAPs currently operate), the OIG previously had not provided much
guidance on this particular issue. In the Bulletin, the OIG confirms that
earmarking contributions for the support of patients with a particular
disease is generally permissible. However, it also expresses a concern with
disease categories that are defined very narrowly:
[W]e are concerned that, in some cases, charities may artificially define their disease
categories so narrowly that the earmarking effectively results in the subsidization of
one (or a very few) of donor's particular products. For example, we would be
concerned if disease categories were defined by reference to specific symptoms,
severity of symptoms, or the method of administration of drugs, rather than by
diagnoses or broadly recognized illnesses or diseases.
120
The Bulletin suggests two ways to manage this risk: (1)
pharmaceutical manufacturers should not influence, directly or indirectly,
the identification of disease or illness categories; and (2) pharmaceutical
manufacturers should limit their earmarked donations to PAPs that define
categories in accordance with widely recognized clinical standards and in a
manner that covers a broad spectrum of available products. 121
3. "Coalition Model" PAPs
Another alternative discussed in the Bulletin involves a group of
manufacturers offering needy Part D enrollees a card or similar vehicle that
would entitle them to subsidies of their cost-sharing obligations for the
manufacturers' products, typically in the form of discounts off the
negotiated price otherwise available to the enrollee under the Part D plan.1
22
The OIG notes that, under this type of program, a manufacturer effectively
would underwrite only the discounts on its own products. This would
appear to conflict with one of the key elements supporting the independent
charity model: namely, that the manufacturer is not assured that its
donations will assist patients using its products. Nevertheless, the OIG
120 id.
121 Id. While these suggestions sound reasonable, they raise additional questions. For
example, is it permissible for a manufacturer to make suggestions to independent PAPs
regarding the creation of general disease categories? Is a manufacturer required to passively
wait until a relevant category is created by a PAP before it can offer donations? What
constitutes "widely recognized clinical standards" in the context of disease category
definitions? Without further guidance from the OIG, manufacturers will struggle with these
issues. As a result, it would be helpful for the OIG to provide additional guidance on a few
issues, including its concerns about: (1) "narrow" disease categories established by
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notes that the risk of an illegal inducement may be reduced if certain
safeguards are in place, including: (1) the program contains features that
adequately safeguard against incentives for card holders to favor one
product over another; (2) the program includes a large number of
manufacturers; and (3) each participating manufacturer offers subsidies for
all of its products that are covered by any Part D plan formulary.1
23
Although it suggests these features for coalition model PAPs, the OIG still
concludes that "it is premature to offer definitive guidance on these
evolving programs."'
124
4. Bulk Replacement Models
Another PAP model considered by the OIG involves "bulk
replacement," in which manufacturers would provide in-kind donations of
free drugs to pharmacies, clinics, or other entities that dispense drugs to
qualifying patients.' 25  The Bulletin appears to contemplate two
possibilities: (1) the bulk replacement product would replace product
dispensed without charge to uninsured patients; and (2) the bulk
replacement product would cover cost-sharing amounts (owed but not
collected) for Medicare Part D enrollees. 26  In either case, the bulk
replacement programs would implicate the Anti-Kickback Statute since the
replacement drugs would be provided by the manufacturer to entities that
are in a position to generate business for it. The Bulletin indicates that, like
the coalition model PAPs, such programs would be analyzed on a case by
case basis. Safeguards would be necessary to ensure that: (1) patients were
not "steered" to particular drugs; (2) federal health care programs did not
incur increased costs; and (3) bulk replacement drugs were not improperly
charged to federal health care programs. 127  Notwithstanding these
safeguards, the OIG appears to still have significant concerns about using
the bulk replacement model to subsidize only the Medicare Part D cost-
sharing amounts. Specifically, according to the OIG, such programs "raise
substantial risks related to accounting for the amount of replacement drug
that would be equivalent to the cost-sharing amount owed by the
beneficiary; properly attributing that amount to specific beneficiaries; and
properly calculating TrOOP.' ' 28  These negative comments suggest that
manufacturers use caution in implementing any program of this type.
123 Id. at 70,627-28.
124 Id. at 70, 627.





5. Manufacturer PAPs Operating Outside Part D
The OIG notes that manufacturer-sponsored PAPs need not remove all
Medicare beneficiaries from their existing programs to be compliant with
the Anti-Kickback Statute. 2 9 Because enrollment in Part D is voluntary,
existing manufacturer PAPs may continue to provide assistance, including
free or reduced outpatient prescription drugs, to Medicare beneficiaries who
have not yet enrolled in Part D. Occasional inadvertent cost-sharing
subsidies to Part D enrolled beneficiaries also will not be problematic if the
PAP did not know, and should not have known that the patient enrolled in
Part D. 13 However, patients who are enrolled in Part D, but do not have
coverage because they have reached the donut hole, are considered insured
by the OIG because they are still enrolled in Part D and are paying
premiums. 13
The Bulletin also suggests that a manufacturer PAP operating outside
of Part D could provide donated product in compliance with the Anti-
Kickback Statute. 32 Specifically, a Medicare beneficiary would obtain
drugs through the PAP without using his or her Part D benefit.
Accordingly, no claims for payment would be filed with a Part D plan, and
the assistance would not count toward TrOOP. The Bulletin states that, as
long as certain safeguards exist, providing free product outside the Part D
benefit poses a reduced risk under the Anti-Kickback Statute. 33 Required
safeguards would include the following: (1) the PAP ensures that Part D
plans are notified that the drug is being provided outside the Part D benefit
so that no payment is made for the drug and the subsidy does not count
toward TrOOP; (2) the PAP provides assistance for the whole Part D
coverage year (or the portion of the coverage year remaining after the
beneficiary first begins receiving the PAP assistance); (3) the PAP
assistance remains available even if the beneficiary's use of the subsidized
drug is periodic during the coverage year; (4) the PAP maintains accurate
and contemporaneous records of the subsidized drugs to permit the
government to verify the provision of drugs outside the Part D benefit; and
(5) assistance is awarded based on reasonable, uniform, and consistent
measures of financial need and without regard to the providers,
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practitioners, or suppliers used by the patient or the Part D plan in which the
patient is enrolled.
34
6. Transitioning Patients from Existing Manufacturer PAPs
The OIG recognizes the difficulties with disenrolling patients who
currently receive medications or financial assistance through a manufacturer
PAP and advises that manufacturer-affiliated PAPs do not have to
immediately disenroll Medicare beneficiaries.135  Rather, because
participation in Part D is voluntary, affected PAPs may continue to provide
subsidies to beneficiaries until they enroll in Part D.
Manufacturers will effectively have a one-year grace period following
the January 1, 2006 start of the Part D benefit to transition Medicare
beneficiaries away from manufacturer-sponsored PAPs to independent
programs. For manufacturer-affiliated PAPs that were in existence prior to
the date of the Bulletin's publication, the OIG will exercise its enforcement
discretion with regard to administrative sanctions under the Anti-Kickback
Statute.136 In the Bulletin, the OIG indicates that, for 2006, it will "take into
consideration in exercising its enforcement discretion ... whether the
[manufacturer] PAP is taking prompt, reasonable, verifiable, and
meaningful steps to transition patients who enroll in Part D to alternative
assistance models, such as independent charities."' 137 In addition, the OIG
suggests other ways for manufacturer PAPs to reduce their fraud and abuse
exposure, including: (1) adjusting their financial need criteria to reflect
lower drug costs incurred by Part D enrollees; (2) subsidizing other drugs in
the same class as the manufacturer's products covered by the PAP if a
beneficiary's physician prescribes an alternate product; and (3) checking
CMS eligibility files, to the extent available, on a regular basis to determine
whether PAP patients have enrolled in Part D and should be transitioned to
other assistance programs.' 
38
V. CONCLUSION
The level of investigation and enforcement activity involving health
care fraud is likely to increase in the next several years as a result of the
new Medicare Part D program. Implementation of Part D alters the health
fraud enforcement environment by creating a new Medicare benefit to
134 Id.
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which the fraud and abuse authorities will apply. One of the government's
main weapons in combating fraud, the Anti-Kickback Statute, figures to be
used by enforcement officials in fighting fraud and abuse within the Part D
program. Consequently, participants in Part D, such as pharmacies and
drug manufacturers, must take care to ensure that their operations are
structured in a compliant manner, including any programs intended to assist
Medicare beneficiaries with meeting their Part D cost-sharing obligations.
Specifically, cost-sharing waivers offered by pharmacies, as well as PAPs
underwritten by pharmaceutical manufacturers, should be structured to
comply with recent OIG guidance.
